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ABSTRACT

The position taken in this paper is that the sentence adverb should be viewed not as an occurrence within a sentence but as a kind of illocutionary force marker of a speech art. Three points are argued in the paper: (1) that current linguistic analyses of sentence adverbs are inadequate even to the purposes of the analysts; (2) that treating sentence adverbs as illocutionary speech acts--more precisely, as illocutionary force markers of propositions--will produce an explanatory model meeting the needs of both linguistic analysts and speech act theorists; and (3) that this explanatory model may be profitably adapted to other language problem areas. The paper also suggests a theoretical connection with conversation analysis. Categories of sentence adverbs/illocutionary force markers are offered, as are their essential conditions. (RL)

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# THE SENTENCE ADVERB AS AN ILLOCUTIONARY SPEECH ACT

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# THE SENTENCE ADVERB AS AN ILLOCUTIONARY SPEECH ACT

In a little-noted and seldom-quoted passage in Speech Acts John Searle proposes this remarkable analogy: "...utterance acts stand to...illocutionary acts in the way in which...making an "X" on a ballot paper stands to voting."[1] In recent years the concept of illocution has been mostly confined to the illocutionary force of certain performative utterances, in effect directing attention away from the illocutionary force potential of other types of speech acts. And while Searle makes clear that utterance, propositional and illocutionary acts are not three simultaneous acts but rather a single act viewed in three ways,[2] the notion of illocutionary force has nonetheless been unnecessarily and unwisely limited by most speech act theorists.

Whether one takes the narrow or the broad view of illocution, however, it may seem on the face of it impossible to fit sentence adverbs into the picture. The sentence adverb is said to be a syntactic phenomenon with certain semantic overtones; it is of interest as behavior of language rather than human behavior with language. Yet it is my intention to bring these notions together by viewing the sentence adverb, not as an occurrence within a sentence, but as a kind of illocutionary force marker of a speech act. The reader is asked to be patient with the early linguistic analysis until, hopefully, the appropriate connection is made with speech act theory.

Three points will be argued: (I) that current linguistic analyses of sentence adverbs are inadequate even to the purposes of the analysts, (II) that treating sentence adverbs as illocutionary speech acts (more precisely, as illocutionary force markers of propositions) will produce an explanatory model which meets many of the needs of the linguistic analyst as well as those of the speech act theorist, and (III) that this explanatory model may be profitably

adapted to other language problem areas. A fourth section suggests briefly a theoretical connection with conversation analysis.

## I. Limitations of Current Treatments of Sentence Adverbs

Origins of the distinction between predicate and sentence adverbs are obscure; but in "A Semantic Theory of Adverbs" Thomason and Stalnaker[3] preface their discourse as follows: "We shall argue that there are two kinds of adverbs in English; some modify predicates, while others modify sentences." Most modern theorists have apparently accepted the distinction with occasional modification of definition.[4] My comments in this section, unless otherwise indicated, are based on the Thomason-Stalnaker distinction or on the extensive amplifications of Renate Bartsch.[5]

A primary difficulty occurs in the distinguishing definition itself; specifically with the word "modify." Sentence adverbs are said to "modify sentences." To fix upon the difficulty with this notion we must remind ourselves what it is to "modify" in the adverbial sense. To modify is to limit or change in some way; the truth-conditions for "John walked slowly" are more stringent than those for "John walked." Thus for an adverb to modify an entire sentence the truth conditions of the latter must be lessened or changed from those of the unmodified sentence. Some sentence adverbs do just this: "John shot Mary" is easier to prove (true more often) than "John shot Mary deliberately." But what about "John unfortunately shot Mary"? The truth-conditions for "John shot Mary" have not been changed one whit by the addition of the sentence adverb "unfortunately." Something has changed; but whatever it is has not altered the truth or falsity of the propositional content. Later I will argue for the shifting of the impact of sentence adverbs from the sentences in which they appear to the speech acts performed by their utterance.

A second problem in current linguistic analysis of sentence adverbs--especially among linguists of the generative-transformational persuasion--is that semantic analyses are often incomplete or inaccurate. In their attempts to squeeze semantic theory into a framework of pre-structured syntactic theory these linguists often leave their semantics half done. (A possible exception is Katz's recent work, Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force,[6] though this too comes at us from a syntax point of view.) Here are a few examples of semantic short shrift:

After outlining some of the problems presented by sentence adverbs, Thomason & Stalnaker[7] announce their intention that "...Sentence adverbs will...denote functions taking propositions into propositions...." This sounds like a good start; but applications which follow are mostly problems of reference or quantifier scope. For example, they offer this widely studied syllogism:

Oedipus intentionally married Jocasta
Jocasta is Oedipus' mother
therefore, Oedipus intentionally married his mother

Whether the Thomason-Stalnaker answer to this alleged dilemma is an improvement over those of the many philosophers from Frege[8] forward who have contended with problems of reference, is beside my point. I contend only that this is not a problem of sentence adverb; and we learn little of use about "intentionally" by this approach.

A problem in quantifier scope ambiguity arises in a distinction by Henry[9] (earlier noted by Montague[10]):

(1) The president signed all the treaties reluctantly.
(2) The president reluctantly signed all the treaties.

At least two readings are possible here. One--that the president's reluctance extended to each treaty individually--can be guaranteed by replacing "all" with "each" in (1). Another meaning--that he was reluctant to commit the Country

to so many treaties--is suggested (but not guaranteed) by replacing "reluctantly signed" with "was reluctant to sign" in (2). One can suggest various meanings by placing the adverb in still other positions. But again, the semantic nature of "reluctantly" is ignored, even obscured, in the process.

Another often-bandied-about example is cited by Lyons:[11]

(3) He slowly tested all the bulbs.
(4) He tested each bulb slowly.

Lyons asserts that the truth-conditions for (3) are different from those for (4), the difference being that (3) predicates slowness of the entire process, while (4)--aided by the quantifier change from "all" to "each"--claims that each separate testing process was slow in itself. Under (3) it would be possible for each testing to be fast, with long coffee-breaks in between, thus slowing the overall process.

Again the analysis seems hasty from a semantic viewpoint. There is reasonable doubt that (3) is a fair expression of the coffee-break situation; for at no time did he test slowly. But apart from the semantic problem, this pair of sentences illustrates (as Lyons notes) a change of quanitfier scope within the sentence rather than an operation on the sentence; and the study of "slowly" (as a possible sentence adverb) never quite happens.

Vennemann[12] uses this example:

(5) The engine was humming mysteriously.
(6) Mysteriously, the engine was humming.

The re-placement of the adverb at the beginning of the sentence presumably has converted a manner adverb into a sentence adverb. And while it is true that (5) and (6) express different propositions--the first describing a kind of humming, the second expressing surprise that any humming was occurring--far more semantic analysis must occur before we can conclude that "mysteriously" can ever function as a manner adverb. Engines may hum softly or loudly, high

or low, steadily or intermittently--but never mysteriously. Mystery is a function of the expectation of a hearer, and may vary from person to person or time to time. The test for this claim lies in hypothesizing two engines humming in identical manner, each in the presence of a different audience. One group of listeners, having heard engines hum but not in this way, might report that the engine was humming "mysteriously" or "in a mysterious manner." The other (more sophisticated) auditors would not find the manner mysterious. Thus the listing of "mysteriously," "annoyingly," and "strangely" as either sentence or manner adverbs (as Vennemann does) is seen to be dubious at best. And again, the transformational-generative viewpoint has drawn attention away from the way true sentence adverbs operate: not within the sentence but on the proposition generated by its utterance.

In what is probably the most thorough work available on adverbials (an entire book devoted to placement, categories, rules and related problems), Renate Bartsch[13] found the Stalnaker-Thomason analysis unsatisfactory on seven counts. The second and third objections dealt with the alleged failure of their system to distinguish adequately the sentence adverb from other related adverbial functions. Part of this shortcoming was attributed to the uni-lingual perspective of Thomason and Stalnaker; their distinctions admittedly applied only to English. Other objections by Bartsch dealt with problems of presupposition and performatives, coming in the process very close to what I believe to be the heart of the semantic problem of adverbials. One might have expected a semantically-oriented solution. But Bartsch's first objection--that Thomason-Stalnaker failed to meet certain syntactic tests--apparently was more important to the author than all the others. For the analytical tests which followed were dictated by considerations of syntax; and the adverbial categories which these tests produced suffered from this

perspective. The tests themselves are perhaps too technical to pursue to advantage here. But any system which produces a taxonomy which places "unjustly," "curiously," and "amiably" in the same category has clearly missed or ignored the semantic point.

Throughout this section I have tried to avoid the appearance of nit-picking. Perhaps I have not succeeded. One must admire the efforts of the generative semanticists as they set about the task of solving a problem of speech act motivation as though it were a problem of syntax with semantic overtones. Attempts to overlay a semantic system on a structured generative system are surely doomed to fail where sentence adverbs are concerned. There are simply too many semantic children in that family to be housed under one roof. More particularly, the reasons why sentence adverbs find their way into sentences are so extra-sentential that treating these adverbs as a part of their parent sentence cannot be the way to go. To understand fully the speech act utterance of "Hopefully, you'll improve," we must separate out the propositional content ("you'll improve") and ask what "hopefully" is doing there. If uttered to a patient in a hospital the utterance may well count as an earnest expression of concern and desire by the speaker. If uttered in the context of a reprimand interview, the utterance may (in part, at least) count as a directive. My point here is not to play upon the different meanings of "improve" but to ask: who is doing the hoping in each case? We cannot understand the original utterance until this question is answered, and maybe not even then. In the next section I will suggest an approach in which the sentence adverb is treated as a special kind of illocutionary force marker, impacting on the propositional content of the parent utterance in a variety of ways.

## II. Sentence Adverb Utterance and Illocutionary Force

It should be noted before proceeding that many of the scholars cited in Section I are fully aware of the extra-sentential function of a sentence adverb to the sentence of which it is formally a part. Lyons,[14] who makes no pretense of dealing with the problem in any detail, notes that, "...looked at from a semantic point of view, they (sentence adverbs) can generally be seen as having some kind of evaluative function. They are used by the speaker in order to express, parenthetically, his opinion or attitude towards the proposition that the sentence expresses or the situation that the proposition describes." And Bartsch[15] confirms: "They are performative expressions in the sense that by uttering them we limit the utterances in which they appear." And more to my point: "In these speech acts one does not state that one suspects or hopes that...but rather one's suppositions or hopes here get a linguistic expression. In the expression of supposition (or in that of hoping) we perform the speech act of supposition (hoping)."[16] The fact that the author was speaking here of performative utterances does not negate the applicability; one can suppose or hope adverbially ("supposedly," "hopefully") as well as with the more explicit "I hope...." The parallel in fact adds credence to the hope that the salvation of sentence adverb analysis lies somewhere in speech act doctrine.

As noted earlier, the notion of illocutionary force must for our purposes be restored to its original meaning: a potential for any speech act rather than a sub-category of speech acts. The latter view is a hard habit to break; for we are accustomed to referring to the illocutionary force of such acts as performative utterances. Nobody wants to talk about stating, for example, although both Austin[17] and Searle[18] include "stating" in their lists of illocutionary verbs. The same point may be made re: "express": many of our

speech acts carry an expressive illocutionary force; but scholars tend to ignore these, probably because the performative "I express..." is relatively rare.

Janet Dean Fodor[19] starts us off in the right direction. After a short but thoughtful treatment of illocutionary acts, in which she guardedly applauds Alston's[20] treatment of illocutionary act potential, she proceeds as follows: "To say what a sentence means, we must specify its illocutionary force potential and its propositional content.... Let us temporarily take a backward (sic) step and consider only declarative sentences, and in particular only those declarative sentences that are standardly used to make statements or assertions." So far, we are right on target. The propositional content of sentences in which sentence adverbs appear can surely be best understood after the sentence adverb has been removed. The sentence adverb provides or alters the illocutionary force of the utterance of the parent sentence. Additionally, sentence adverbs occur almost exclusively in declarative sentences used to assert or state. (The fact that some yes-or-no questions can tolerate sentence adverbs should not deter us; standard transformational procedures can be used to convert these questions to statements.) Fodor continues: "From the speech act theory of meaning we can draw the insight that the meaning of...a sentence cannot be explicated without reference to its use for the making of statements. While rejecting the verificationist theory we can retain the insight that it is of the nature of statements to be true or false." This is hardly a novel observation; but it further justifies the extrication of the sentence adverb from the parent sentence. For the truth-conditions of the latter may be impossible to determine with the former present. Truth-conditions for "He is unfortunately mistaken" are impossible to determine as long as "unfortunately" is in there.

We are ready, then, to construct an explanatory model based on a proposition (P) generated by the utterance of declarative sentence (S), under the impact of a variety of sentence adverbs. The adverbs will be categorized by the illocutionary force exerted on the proposition when one of them intrudes upon its content. The model appears in Figure I (Sentence Adverbs as Illocutionary Force Markers).

(Figure I about here)

Several explanations are in order. First, the five categories are introspectively arrived at; there are surely more; and there is no assurance against overlap. Like semantic space, the illocutionary range of the sentence adverb is of unknown dimentionality. Second, it should be immediately apparent that one cannot insert just any sentence adverb into just any proposition. The entire third category, for example, might well be collectively excluded as candidates for insertion into "He is mistaken." (One might argue, that is, that one cannot be deliberately mistaken. One may make a deliberate mistake, such as writing "2 + 2 = 5" when one knows the correct answer is "4;" but to include this situation as a truth-condition of "He is mistaken" would be doubtful at best. It takes a sentence like "John shot the cow" to tolerate sentence adverbs of Category III.) Finally, the placement I have given to certain sentence adverbs is certainly subject to argument. The inclusion of "hopefully" in both Category I and Category IV, for example, may well provoke the question of whether "hopefully" does indeed carry both the evaluative and the conviction-level illocutionary force in all propositions in which it appears. I do not consider this to be a conceptual problem affecting the Model; it merely points to a gaping hole in our knowledge of what we are doing when we utter sentence adverbs.

Perhaps the best next step is to ask how propositions containing sentence

FIGURE I

SENTENCE ADVERVS AS ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE MARKERS

(1) Evaluation

regrettably
(un) fortunately
happily
sadly
foolishly
hopefully
importantly

(2) Expectation

naturally
typically
curiously
strangely
unexpectedly
remarkably
incredibly

(S) He is mistaken.

(P) (that) he is mistaken.

(5) Inevitability

clearly
obviously
manifestly
patently

(3) Motivation

deliberately
(un) intentionally
(un) consciously
accidentally
reluctantly

(4) Conviction Level

surely
certainly
undoubtedly
possibly
probably
hardly
supposedly
presumably
conceivably
allegedly
hopefully

LEGEND

(S) = Sentence
(P) = Proposition

adverbs would be treated as speech acts apart from their adverbial nature. Excluding for the moment the occasional qualifying interrogative, and using Searle's[21] model, we find these propositions categorized as those which "Assert, state (that), affirm." (Thus "He is mistaken" asserts or affirms that he--somebody--is mistaken.) The given rules or conditions for such acts are: Preparatory (1) S has evidence...for the truth of the proposition, (2) It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows...that which is being asserted; Sincerity: S believes that the proposition is true; Essential: Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the proposition represents an actual state of affairs. (Italics mine)

Now all this causes no problem with "He is mistaken." But change the utterence to "He is unfortunately mistaken," and none of the rules will work! That his mistakenness is unfortunate is not a matter of evidence or knowledge, nor of the speaker's belief in the strict sense of "belief," nor of any measurable state of affairs. For in the last analysis two things are happening in one speech act: mistakenness is being asserted; and the feeling called "unfortunate" is being given linguistic expression. Bartsch's point regarding the illocutionary difference in these two functions cannot be ignored; it can only be expanded.

What is needed, then, is a set of rules or conditions for each category of sentence adverb. In Figure II, I have listed essential conditions only, the assumption being that preparatory and sincerity conditions are in most cases inapplicable, unimportant or obvious.

(Figure II about here)

One could spend countless hours tinkering with the categories in Figure I, adding categories and examples, and inventing situations in which the rules don't apply. (One wonders, for example, what to do with "frankly" and

FIGURE II

ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS

(1) Evaluation: Counts as an expression of approval or disapproval of (P)

(2) Expectation: Counts as a measurement of (P) against what might be expected.

(3) Motivation: Counts as an estimation of intention or motive in agent of (P).

(4) Conviction Level: Counts as an expression of the probable truth or falsity of (P).

(5) Inevitability: Counts as an expression of the inevitability of concluding (P) from the available evidence.

FIGURE III

ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS REVISED

(1) Evaluation: Counts as an expression of S's approval or disapproval of (P), with an assumption of comparable evaluation by H.

(2) Expectation: Counts as a measurement of (P) against S's expectation, with an assumption of comparable expectation by H.

(3) Motivation: Counts as S's estimation of intention or motive in agent of (P), with an assumption of similar estimation by H.

(4) Conviction Level: Counts as an expression of S's belief concerning the probable truth or falsity of (P), with an assumption of comparable belief by H.

(5) Inevitability: Counts as S's expression of the inevitability of concluding (P) from the available evidence, with an assumption that H must find the conclusion equally inescapable.

LEGEND
(P) = Proposition
S = Speaker
H = Hearer

"honestly"--see Section IV for further comment.) But one remarkable feature seems inescapable in all categories, a feature which shows most clearly in the attempts to formulate essential conditions. The evaluation, expectation, motivation,[22] conviction level and inevitability have been quietly assumed to be those of the speaker, presumably because he is believed responsible for the illocutionary force of his utterance. But when I say "He is unfortunately mistaken," I am doing much more with "unfortunately" than expressing my feeling of his mistakenness; I am expressing (or perhaps concealing) an assumption that you (everyone) ought to feel the same. To reflect this added force the essential conditions must be rewritten (Figure III). Here we have, in my view, the most important justification for treating the utterance of a sentence adverb as an illocutionary speech act. For only through such an analysis can we see the speaker's evaluations, expectations, and doubts separated from the proposition into which they have been so finely infused with the inocuous sentence adverb.

(Figure III about here)

III. Other Applications

Assuming for the moment a tentative acceptance of the foregoing analysis and subsequent model, one might now characterize sentence adverbs as adverbial forms performing non-adverbial functions. Such form-function disparity is no stranger to the philosopher of language; many puzzling linguistic functions have under close scrutiny turned out to be nothing more than a formulation which looks like one thing and acts like another. In this section I shall apply the illocutionary force model to three such language problems: the use of direct address for non-locative functions, the use of the "if-then" form for non-implicative functions, and the use of "because" for non-causal functions. Though seemingly wide apart conceptually, these phenomena of

language have in common the fact that, as does the sentence adverb, they work from within (or adjacent to) the proposition to exert a special force on the proposition; within the speech act containing their utterance, two distinct illocutionary forces are at work. First, direct address:

(7) Mr. Jones, your coffee is ready.
(8) Hey, Joe, what time is it?
(9) Honey, for God's sake get off my back!

These three examples represent the commonest uses of direct address. Each prefaces a different kind of sentence; but the purpose is the same: to help the message toward its intended destination. The name or title is not part of the propositional content; when the social context of the speech act suggests that the wrong hearer may be reached, the prefatory use of a direct address form acts in a manner analogous to the address on an envelope. It is not part of the message; it directs the message.

Superficially it would seem that nothing more need be said. Linguists have little difficulty handling this form; they merely set it aside. There is no real danger of confusing the direct address nominal with nominal reference (although, paradoxically, Searle[23] maintains that in "Sam, smoke habitually!", Sam is being referred to or mentioned or designated--not addressed.) The problem arises when direct address is used in a context where there can be no doubt as to the intended recipient, as in the intimate dyad. Applying the illocutionary force treatment to such a situation, we see that in "Honey, I wish you'd call her!", "Honey" cannot possibly be functioning as a message-director: there's only one Honey around. Yet "I wish you'd call her!" clearly does not carry the same force. How are we to formulate the essential condition for this speech act? What does it count as?

As with so many sentence adverbs, this question cannot be immediately answered. One requires a thorough analysis of the conversational episode

which generated the speech act before one can safely characterize this instance of non-locative address. The fact that we can't yet say whether the utterance of "Honey" in this case carries the illocutionary force of a reprimand, a conciliation, or what, merely underscores the need to establish carefully defined categories with carefully worded essential conditions, and to develop a workable method for sorting out candidates. We can't fully understand the meaning of a given illocutionary speech act until this is done, and maybe not even then.

In moving from direct address to the "if-then" formula, we must realize that we are moving into the realm of the logician. Formal logic has dealt with the implication relation off and on for centuries; and modern logicians seem generally satisfied with their account of how this logical relation functions in natural languages. Represented symbolically, "P implies Q" is usually defined as -(P&-Q), i.e., "It is not the case that P is true and Q is false." In natural language it often takes the form "If P, then Q."

Consider for example the assertion, "If iron is heated, it will expand." Such a proposition is easily understood and readily verified. We merely bring about or produce the antecedent (we heat some iron) and then look for the presence or absence of the consequent (expansion). If the iron does expand, the sentence is said to be true. But here is another sentence almost identical syntactically to the first: "If you're looking for the beer, it's in the cooler." Now surely, if the beer is indeed in the cooler, it is there whether I am looking for it or not. Thus the "if" clause, so important in the "iron" proposition, has no truth function in this sentence. A moment's reflection tells us that the phrase, "If you are looking for the beer" is included in a lame attempt to explain why the remaining proposition is being offered.

Viewed as an illocutionary speech act, then, "If you are looking for the beer" has the force of a justifier. It answers the anticipated question, "Why are they telling me this?". Here are some more justifiers:

(10) You may use the bedroom phone if you think it's quieter.
(11) If you like modern music, we have it all.
(12) For those who vibrate to the spectacular, there's a charming waterfall...
(13) In case of an air raid, shelters are located as follows:...
(14) If you ask me, he's crazy.

It should be noted that, despite some structural deviation--(12) and (13) do not use "if"--all are alike in that the qualifying clauses do not qualify; they justify. They carry the illocutionary force of justification; and their essential condition is that they count as a reason for offering the information contained in the proposition to which they are attached. Once again, speech acts analysis tells us what is going on, while syntactic representations (even with semantic overlay) do not.

Finally, the "because" formula has been similarly pre-empted to perform an unexpected function. When used to perform a unique (as opposed to generic) speech act, "because" is supposed to be a reason-marker: "I stayed home because I had a cold." The proposition following the "because" is expected to count as a reason for the proposition to which it is attached. But consider this example, offered by Alice Davison[24] under the heading, REASON ADVERBIALS:

(15) The game had already started, because nobody was home when I arrived.

Clearly the fact that nobody was home had nothing to do with causing the game to start. Once again we have two illocutionary forces at work in one speech act: one counting as an assertion, the other counting as an explanation as to how the speaker knows his assertion is true.

We have looked at three extensions of the analysis originally applied to sentence adverbs. It is significant that in none of these cases does syntactic structure tell us what we want to know. And while the model suggested in this paper may not help us in distinguishing well-formed from ill-formed sentences, it does have the virtue of asking the semantic and pragmatic questions first. For only after these problems have been solved can we look back to surface structure and discover how the intricate semantic complexities we've uncovered have woven themselves into conventional sentential forms.

## IV. Relation to Current Theories of Conversational Implicature

To this point I have suggested an extra-sentential method for dealing with sentence adverbs and indicated other linguistic forms to which my model might be applied to advantage. There remains only to make an obvious but important connection between the illocutionary approach suggested herein and the theory which underlies certain current methods of conversation analysis. To make this connection most vividly it is necessary to establish a Sixth Category of sentence adverb as follows:

Category (6): Mood Markers

frankly
honestly
bluntly
confidentially

ESSENTIAL CONDITION: Counts as an announcement of a change from existing or expected mood of discourse.

At first glance one is tempted to include the above sentence adverbs under "Expectation" (Category 2). Indeed, both groups are measured against expectation, but in different ways. The utterance of "strangely," "unexpectedly," and the like, warn us that the proposition is unexpected; i.e., that neither

the speaker nor the hearer might, in the normal run of things, have expected the event predicated in the proposition. In assertion form:

(16) Strangely, he is mistaken.

(17) Frankly, he is mistaken.

or

(18) He is strangely mistaken.

(19) He is frankly mistaken.

Clearly (16) and (18) are behaving in a different way from (17) and (19). In the former, what is strange is <u>that he is mistaken</u>. In the latter, what is frank is the mood created by the very act of asserting his mistakenness. The illocutionary force of "frankly" is that of an announcement or warning that the ensuing assertion will in manner or matter be more direct than previous discourse, or than speaker and hearer have a right to expect under the circumstances.

It is important to note that "frankly" in (17) and (19) is essentially redundant; if the utterance of "He is mistaken" in a given conversational sequence comprises a genuine departure from previous or expected mood, both speaker and hearer will know it--presumably by some unspoken principle of conversation. Thus the insertion of "frankly" may be more properly regarded as a justification or apology. It is precisely because we know--and how we know--that "frankly" <u>is</u> redundant in a given context, that we can conclude that a significant component of its meaning derives from its emergence in a given episode of conversation, and from no other source. This brings us to a theoretical synapse.

H. P. Grice, a pioneer in conversation analysis, words his third Conversational Postulate as follows:

> ...(3) that there is some sort of understanding...that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate.[25]

The italics (mine) point up what I consider to be the salient point of this Postulate: that there is some kind of style appropriate to a given conversation or episode (not even hinted at in the first two Postulates), and that this style is presumably expected to continue throughout the conversation. Thus when a given conversation is about to shift to a more candid style, the speaker initiating the shift prepares his hearer with "Frankly...". The illocutionary force of this utterance is that of a preparation, a warning, an apology, or whatever--but it has nothing to do with the propositional content of the utterance in which it appears.

A similar connection is seen with the "actional meaning" concept advanced by Farrell and Frentz.[26] In this paradigm a kind of utterance meaning is said to unfold from adherence to (or violation of) three sets of rules: episodic rules (...devices that mark an array of optimal or available sequence patterns among symbolic acts,...), encounter rules (constructs that demarcate types of possible communication exchange, given the indexical and situational demands of place.), and form-of-life rules (a...constellation of social practices that fixes the uses of concepts and expressions.). If one envisions a conversational episode proceeding in accordance with such rules, it is easy to see how a participant, sensing that he/she is about to break a rule, might preface the deviation with "frankly," "honestly," "confidentially" or the like. Again, the illocutionary force of the intruding adverb is that of an announcement that a rule is about to be violated, and of an invitation to the hearer to join in the conspiracy. In this sense a conversational dyad is like two contact dancers, with the leader (by imperceptible move, gesture or pressure) inviting

the other to share in a new direction.

Of course these connections have been illustrated with only one category of sentence adverb; with examples such as "probably" and "deliberately" the application seems more obscure. But in each instance of sentence adverb (and, indeed, of those form-function disparities discussed in Section III) one theme persists: a contextual sequence develops to a point where a potential assertion is (perhaps subconsciously) rejected by a speaker who, through some hidden rule, senses that its utterance here in bald form will not do. Thus the naked proposition is clothed with an illocutionary force marker--perhaps a sentence adverb woven inconspicuously into the syntax--directing the message, or apologizing for it, or softening it, or strengthening it, or regretting it, or assuring the hearer of its truth. And always there is the subtle entreaty to the hearer to share the speaker's bent, so that both may nod their heads together and feel for the moment that they are of one mind and one heart. Kempson finds in this linguistic yearning a link between speech act doctrine and Gricean communication theory: "...Austin's account of speech acts naturally meshes in with Grice's account of communication; for both the determination of the illocutionary force of an utterance and any implicated message it may be intended to convey depend on shared assumptions by the speaker and hearer...."

In speech acts performed by laymen in lay circumstances, their statements or assertions are rarely uttered unadorned. We feel compelled to couch the propositional content of our assertions in devices which indicate (glaringly or unobtrusively) how we know, why we say, why we say this way, how we feel about it all, and anything else we care to reveal--each device exerting its own illocutionary force, and each urging the hearer to come along. The sentence adverb is one such device. Viewing it as a special kind of adverb in a

sentence can at best lead to rules governing its presence and position in the sentence we generate. Regarding it as a speech act with its own illocutionary force offers some hope, at least, of illuminating one corner of the vast mansion of semantic structure.

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[13]Bartsch, pp. 80-82.

[14]Lyons, p. 452.

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[16]Sentence adverbs in some categories may be subject to argument on this point.

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